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Abstract: Healthcare accessibility and equity remain important issues, as corruption in the form
of informal payments is still prevalent in many countries across the world. This study employs a
panel data analysis over the 2006–2013 period to explore the role of different institutional factors
in explaining the prevalence of informal payments. Covering 117 countries, our findings confirm
the significant role of both formal and informal institutions. Good governance, a higher trust
among individuals, and a higher commitment to tackling corruption are associated with diminishing
informal payments. In addition, higher shares of private finance, such as out-of-pocket and domestic
private health expenditure, are also correlated with a lower prevalence of informal payments. In
policy terms, this displays how correcting institutional imperfections may be among the most efficient
ways to tackle informal payments in healthcare.
Keywords: informal payments; formal institutions; informal institutions; healthcare system;
corruption; trust
1. Introduction
The issue of good health has become more salient than ever amidst the current Covid-
19 pandemic. Its magnitude and diffusion have caused major disruptions to the health
systems [1,2]. The reallocation of health resources in dealing with the pandemic has
reduced the capacity of providers to address other health issues, leading to accessibility
constraints [3]. As a result, patients have tried to gain preferential access to medical
services using different practices, including informal payments [4,5], which puts into
question the efficiency and equity of health care provision. What is more, it seems that
no progress has yet been made in fighting against informal payments, as these seem
to be increasing. According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) carried out by
Transparency International, informal payments for medical services have almost doubled
between 2006 and 2013, reaching 17% (of all respondents). Furthermore, healthcare also
seems to be among the most affected sectors. For instance, in 2020, the medical sector
reported the highest rate of informal payments, used in the form of bribes (6% of all
respondents) [6].
The growth of informal payments raises concerns about achieving universal health
coverage. The emergence of informal payments is clearly a sign that a health system fails
to provide equitable access to healthcare, and the drivers behind such practices require par-
ticular attention. Unless the issues driving under-the-table payments are addressed, such
informal payments will not be solved. Previous studies have emphasized the fundamental
role played by both formal and informal institutions as drivers of informal payments. The
formal institutional factors particularly relate to poor governance (e.g., poor regulations,
lack of political stability) and institutional imperfections in providing healthcare services
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(e.g., resource efficiency, health accessibility; see [7–10]). From this perspective, informal
payments may serve to help patients to access faster, better, or additional services [11,12]. In-
formal payments may also occur due to other informal institutional, namely socio-cultural,
reasons, which might make patients more prone to such behavior (e.g., the social custom
of expressing gratitude through informal payments, a higher inclination towards illicit
behavior, a lack of alignment between the formal and informal institutions) [13,14].
Studying the occurrence of informal payments is crucial in order to deter any ad-
ditional barriers to healthcare accessibility, and rebuild the trust between patients and
health workers. Grounded in the institutional theory which emphasises the importance of
institutions in explaining social, economic, and political dynamics [15], our study looks
at the role of both formal and informal institutions in explaining and tackling unofficial
payments. Formal institutions are ‘the rules of the game’, and refer to the regulations and
the organizational environment [15,16]. Meanwhile, informal institutions are the ‘socially
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of
officially sanctioned channels’ [17]. To achieve this, a panel data analysis is carried out over
117 countries during the 2006–2013 period for estimating the effects of various categories of
drivers related to both formal and informal institutions (countries included in the analysis
are listed in the Appendix A). To our knowledge, there is no previous study exploring the
level of informal payments which covers such a wide range of countries and years.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section scrutinizes the
literature to gauge the relationship between the institutional environment and informal
payments in healthcare and, consequently, the hypotheses to be tested. Each hypothesis
is grounded in institutional theory based on the findings in previous studies, and tested
using variables related to the quality of governance, formal institutional imperfections
in providing healthcare services (i.e., resource allocation and accessibility to healthcare
services), and the quality of informal institutions (i.e., patient‘s norms and values). The
third section describes the methodology, and examines the geographical heterogeneity of
informal payments and its links with institutional quality. The estimation and interpretation
of results and discussions are addressed in the fourth and fifth sections, while the last
section draws conclusions.
Tackling Informal Payments for Healthcare: What Role for Institutions?
Formal institutional imperfections are generally related to the quality of governance
and resource availability, which can reduce the quality of medical services and restrain
access to healthcare. Previous studies have shown that institutional bottlenecks may lead
to a higher propensity for informal payments. This practice is associated with a lack of
trust in political authorities, and is more widespread in countries with higher corruption
levels. A lack of preventive measures, and poor regulation and law enforcement are also
associated with higher informal payments [18–20]:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Quality of Governance: Informal payments in health are more likely to occur
with ill-functioning formal institutions.
Health resource availability and the way it is allocated are also decisive for healthcare
delivery. When resources are scarce, patients may look to gain preferential access by
relying on informal payments [21,22]. Informal payments also stem from the fact that
medical staff are underpaid [23,24]. Lower levels of health expenditures may also lead to
underfinancing and, thus, to a precariousness of health workers conditions (for instance,
the austerity measures pursued during the Great Recession that did not spare healthcare
expenditures [25,26]). Therefore, our next hypothesis states that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Resource allocation: Higher shares of financial resources/private financing
reduce informal payments in health.
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Hypothesis 2a (H2a). The higher the share of health resources, the lower is the prevalence of
informal payments in health.
Financing the health system is among the main challenges faced by states in order to
provide universal and sustained access to health delivery. When public budget allocations
are not sufficient, private sources need to compensate for it. On the one hand, patients need
to make direct payments to healthcare providers at the time of service use, also known
as out-of-pocket payments [27]. Although this alternative financing may undermine the
equity of the healthcare system, this is often associated with lower informal payments
levels [28]. On the other hand, the insufficient supply of medical services may leave larger
room for private health care providers, which is also correlated with a lower prevalence of
informal payments [11,29]. Therefore, our hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). The higher the share of private financing, the lower the prevalence of
informal payments in health.
The increasing demand for healthcare occurring with development has emphasized
the shortage of health workers. For instance, the worldwide nursing shortage was estimated
to reach 5.9 million nurses in 2018 [30]. Though the more developed countries have the
resources to attract foreign health workers [31], this leaves most of the deficit concentrated
in low- and lower-middle-income countries [30,32]. This leaves less-developed countries
struggling to provide fair healthcare accessibility, which leads the population to seek access
to medical services by informal payments [22,33,34]:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Healthcare accessibility: higher accessibility rates reduce informal payments
in health.
Besides the quality of governance, and the organization and financing of the health
systems, informal payments may also stem from cultural and social factors, as well as
from the individual’s norms and values. For instance, a more tolerant public attitude on
corruption and illicit behavior may hinder the fight against informal payments [11]. A lack
of trust in institutions, including health systems, may also make informal payments more
likely [35]. Other times, informal payments may be rooted in social customs of giving a gift
to express gratitude [13,36,37]. We therefore assume that:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Patients’ norms and values: Informal payments in health are more likely to
occur with ‘bad’ informal institutions.
The role of informal institutions is also particularly important in preventing medical
workers to exploit their informational asymmetry advantage compared with patients. Thus,
individual self-regulation and trust becomes particularly important in the patient–doctor
relationship [38].
2. Materials and Methods
In order to measure the level of informal payments in the health sector, this study
uses the results of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) carried out by Transparency
International. Among the biggest surveys worldwide tracking public opinion on corruption,
the survey also captures their direct experience with bribery, and their willingness to
stop corruption.
The dependent variable is whether patients made extra informal payments apart from
the official fees. This is based on their response to the question: ‘In your contact or contacts
with the institutions have your or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any
form in the past 12 months?’ Amongst the institutions listed, we have considered the share
of population answering ‘Yes’ for ‘Medical and health services’.
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The main interest explanatory variables tested are related to the quality of both formal
and informal institutions [39]. The quality of governance for testing H1 is measured
through the World Bank Quality of Governance Index, which reflects the ‘traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’. World Health Organization
variables, such as the share of health expenditure, and out-of-pocket and domestic private
health expenditure, are used for evaluating resource allocation in health for testing H2.
Similarly, the number of medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants (the lower the figure, the
lower the healthcare accessibility) is used for evaluating healthcare accessibility, needed
for testing H3. Meanwhile, for capturing informal institutions to test H4, two explanatory
variables are used from the database, aggregated from various sources by the Quality
of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg [40], namely: social trust, and
the share of population who feel personally obliged to report an act of corruption. Both
measures are used to evaluate the quality of informal institutions. Indeed, social trust is
extensively used in the literature as a measure for informal institutions (e.g., [41], the share
of the population who feel personally obliged to report corruption captures the morality
of the citizens, similarly to considering it unacceptable and informing authorities when
other citizens are cheating on taxes [42,43]). Details about the main interest explanatory
variables are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A.
For estimating the role of institutions in explaining informal payments in the health
sector, our study relies on a panel data model over the 2006–2013 period. Although the
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) was initiated in 2003, the question referring to informal
payments in the health sector was initially included in 2006. Therefore, our main interest
variable, which derives from the GCB, was collected over the 2006–2007, 2009–2011, and
2013 (the panel is unbalanced, with full observations available for only 30 countries). The
most recent version of the GCB, collected in 2017, did not publish any data referring to this
question. The 2021 updated version of the database collected by the Quality of Government
Institute at the University of Gothenburg also only includes data up to 2013 [40].
The fixed effects specification was indicated as preferable by the Hausman test, the
null hypothesis that all-time dummies are jointly null was also rejected. Thus, the following
two-way fixed effects model specification was estimated:
In f ormal paymentsi,t = α + βInstitutionsi,t + γXi,t + δt + ηi + εi,t, (1)
where In f ormal paymentsi,t captures the prevalence of informal payments in healthcare
in country i in year t; α is the intercept; Institutionsi,t is a measure of institutional quality;
Xi,t−1 includes a set of explanatory variables; δtare sets of time-specific intercepts; ηi are
the unobserved country specific effects; and εi,t are the error terms. The homoscedas-
ticity assumption was rejected by the modified Wald test, following Greene [44]. The
Wooldridge test [45] for serial autocorrelation could not be performed due to the unbal-
anced nature of our sample. However, the errors were clustered by countries in order to
produce asymptotically valid inferences in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation.
A similar cross-section specification of the model was implemented to estimate the
relation between informal institutions and informal payments in health, given the lack of
time data regarding the population social norms and values. However, informal institutions
are hardly variable in a shorter interval such as the one covered by our panel analysis,
which makes the cross-section estimator a reliable alternative. Socio-economic variables
are also included as controls in the analysis (e.g., education, employment, GDP), similar to
various studies evaluating informal economy [46–48], corruption, and informal payments
in the health sector [49–51].
It is worth mentioning that five year-variables were used for the cross-section model
over the 2008–2013 period. For the variables measuring informal institutions, as the QoG
Standard Cross Section dataset also specifies, data from and around 2017 is included, with
a ±3 years margin interval.
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As a robustness check, censored regression models were also estimated, which allows
control for restrictions in the range of the dependent variable. First, the doubly censored
tobit estimator was used [52] was used. This uses a maximum likelihood estimation, and
is based on a random-effects specification due to the problems occurring in fixed-effects
specifications [53]. The dependent variable is doubly censored, with the limits close to the
minimum and the maximum values observed in our sample considering the countries and
period analyzed (the lower limit was set at 0.00, and the upper limit at 0.67). Furthermore,
our results were shown to be robust to changes of censoring limits. Second, we run a model




An overview on the data capturing the incidence of informal payments reveals that,
on average, over 15% percent of patients have been involved in such payments when
coming in contact with an institution providing health or medical services. (We focus
on the cross-sectional data, which provides a better reflection of the level of informal
payments in healthcare, since they were computed as averages over the 2009–2013 period).
Zooming in more on the data shows a high heterogeneity, with rates between 0% and
66%. According to the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) carried out by Transparency
International, Switzerland was the only country to report 0% informal payments (in 2006).
However, the yearly average over the entire period is slightly higher (1.48%). There are
seven countries, from different geographical areas, with an average incidence below 1%,
namely Brunei, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway, South Korea, and Uruguay. At the
other end, lies Burundi and Azerbaijan with 66.4 and 50.9% of respondents declaring that
they (or their household) made informal payments when accessing health services.
It is also interesting to note that the incidence of under-the-table payments decreases
with the development level: there is a 7% incidence in high income countries (following
the World Bank classification), whereas informal payments spread to slightly over 20% in
lower middle-income countries, and almost 31% in lower income countries (See Table A2
in Appendix A). Geographically, it is generally the countries from Africa, Middle-East,
and Central and Southern Asia which display a higher incidence of informal payments.
Informal payments are also spread among patients in Eastern Europe. Specifically, there
are former Soviet states (Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia), as well as EU member states,
such as Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary, where this practice is more prevalent
(See Figure 1). It is worth mentioning that though the classes include an equal number of
observations, the amplitude of classes is different (see the histogram in Figure 1). Though
the first two classes include a third of the countries represented, with values between 0
and 6%, the observations included in the last class have the highest standard deviation
(including values between 66% and 30%).
Looking at the correlation between institutional quality and informal payments, this
seems to be negatively associated. Countries with stronger institutions seem to generally
display a lower incidence of informal healthcare payments (see Figure 2). The negative
relation seems to hold when the strength of informal institutions is investigated. Stronger
social capital, proxied by a higher trust in a population, seems to be associated with a lower
incidence of under-the-table payments (Figure A1a in Appendix A). This is also true when
looking at social norms, which indicates that informal payments for medical services are
less widespread in countries where populations feel more engaged in reporting corruption
(Figure A1b in Appendix A).
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Figure 1. The incidence of under-the-table payments in health (% respondents, 2009–2013). Notes: This is based on their
response to the question: ‘In your contact or contacts with the institutions have your or anyone living in your household paid
a bribe in any form in the past 12 months?’; share of population answering ‘Yes’ for ‘Medical and health services’. The classes
include an equal number of observations. Source: Authors’ representation using data from Transparency International.
–
response to the question: ‘In your contact or contacts ith t  i stit ti s have your or anyone living in your household 
paid a ribe in any form in the past 12 months?’ share of  s ering ‘Yes’ for ‘Medical and health services’.
’ re resentation using dat  from Transparency In-
 
– uthors’ representation using data from Trans-
—
Figure 2. The relation between informal payments in health and the quality of governance. Note:
Average values over the 2009–2013 period. Source: Authors’ representation using data from Trans-
parency International and the World Bank.
Though in terms of formal institutional strength, the higher and upper-middle income
states generally display the higher scores (with the Scandinavian countries ranking on
top—see Figure A2a in Appendix A), the relation with income level is less clear when
it comes to informal institutions. For instance, it seems that there is also a quite high
level of high social trust in low-income countries, such as Haiti, Tajikistan, or Yemen
(Figure A2b in Appendix A). At the other end, there is a low level of trust in high income
countries, such as Chile, Cyprus, and Greece. However, the population is also better
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engaged in reporting corruption in more developed countries, with around 90% percent
of the population in Australia, Portugal, and Spain feeling personally obliged to report
corruption acts (Figure A2c in Appendix A).
3.2. Findings
The estimation results of the role of institutional quality in tackling informal payments
in healthcare are reported in Tables 1 and 2: Table 1 displays results for the panel data
model which captures the influence of formal institutions, and Table 2 accounts for the
effects of informal institutions in a cross-sectional model. (The lack of times series data
assessing the informal institutions worldwide forced us to reduce the panel model to a
cross-sectional form). The panel data model includes both country and time fixed effects,
which allows one to control for any country-specific characteristics unobserved in the
model, or any unobserved time shocks. Due to its lower number of observations, the
cross-section specification only includes income group dummies, following the World Bank
income classification. This allows controlling for unobserved factors which are specific to
different development levels.
Overall, our findings confirm that both formal and informal institutions play a sig-
nificant role in reducing patients under-the-table payments. First, the coefficient of the
quality of governance seems to be statistically significant and stable in most of the models,
with values between 0.842 and −1.036 in both time dynamic and cross-section specifi-
cations (H1a is confirmed). The interpretation would suggest that a 1-point increase in
the Quality of Governance Index (which corresponds to a 20% improvement, given the
0–5 scale) would reduce informal payments by 62% (specifically, the effect is computed
as follows: (e−0.978 − 1) × 100 = −62.4%) if the other variables are held constant (Model
2 in Table 1). The role of institutions in combat informal payments also holds when the
censored estimators are used (columns 8–9 in Tables 1 and 2). When computing elasticities
(column 9 in Table 1), the results showed that under-the-table payments decrease when
quality of governance improves at a rate such that, if the rate were constant, informal
payments would decrease by 1.57% if quality of governance increased by 1%. The effect
is stronger for the countries with lower quality of governance. For instance, for countries
with a quality of governance of 1 (given the 0–5 scale), if the rest of the variables are at their
corresponding values, a 1-point increase in quality of governance would lead to a decrease
in informal payments by 0.10 percentage points. The effect decreases for countries with a
quality of governance evaluated at 4, where the effect decreases to 0.03 percentage points.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient displayed by the censored estimators is similar
in the cross-sectional model (Table 2), thus, proving the robustness of our results.
The role of institutions in combating informal payments in healthcare does not seem
to differ by the development level of countries. In order to test this hypothesis, we relied on
several interaction terms. Specifically, for each of the institutional variables, we have also
computed interaction terms with two binary variables accounting for the development level
of countries. The two binary variables are taking the value one for the low income/high
income countries, or zero otherwise (following the World Bank classification in 2018). As the
interaction terms were not statistically significant, we decided not to report these results.
It is also interesting to note that the level of informal payments appears to be lower in
health systems with higher shares of private financing. Larger shares of private expendi-
tures, as well out-of-pocket shares, to current health expenditure seems to lead to lower
informal payments, thus confirming Hypothesis 2.
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Table 1. Panel estimation of the role of formal institutions in explaining bribes in the health sector, 2006–2013.
Two-Way Fixed Effects Tobit
Fractional
Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of Education −2.235 −2.518 −2.915 −2.636 −2.540 4.992 −7.302 −0.0183 −0.0542
(4.709) (4.822) (4.875) (4.975) (4.528) (5.431) (4.653) (0.0337) (0.142)
Log of Age dependency −1.282 −1.543 −1.596 −1.511 −1.569 −2.169 −2.402 −0.0604 −0.417 *
(1.964) (1.911) (1.912) (1.951) (2.177) (1.980) (1.905) (0.0581) (0.249)
Log of Employment 2.546 ** 3.001 ** 2.977 ** 3.006 ** 3.059 ** 3.280 *** 2.814 ** −0.0231 −0.256
(1.280) (1.225) (1.214) (1.229) (1.171) (1.240) (1.138) (0.0484) (0.216)
Life expectancy 0.142 * 0.142 ** 0.147 * 0.144 * 0.142 * 0.192 * 0.142 ** −0.00522 ** −0.0299 ***
(0.0762) (0.0687) (0.0757) (0.0764) (0.0755) (0.0991) (0.0716) (0.00233) (0.0112)
Log of Health expenditures −0.255 −0.180 −0.203 −0.0756 −0.0730 1.134 * −0.245 0.0279 0.127
(0.418) (0.404) (0.424) (0.494) (0.514) (0.627) (0.416) (0.0252) (0.105)
Log of Out-of-pocket expenditure −0.660 ** −0.704 **
(0.287) (0.272)
Quality of governance −0.978 * −1.010 * −1.024 * −1.036 * −0.499 −0.947 * −0.0608 *** −0.324 ***
(0.550) (0.554) (0.563) (0.535) (0.631) (0.529) (0.0182) (0.0839)
Log of Private health expenditure −0.643 ** −0.696 ** −0.685 ** −1.126 ** −0.574 * −0.0153 −0.0425
(0.297) (0.314) (0.298) (0.445) (0.295) (0.0178) (0.0651)
GDP per capita growth −0.00353
(0.00613)
Log of GDP per capita −0.0595
(0.699)




Obs./Countries 353/117 353/117 353/117 345/113 345/113 263/97 353/117 354/117 354/117
R-squared 0.223 0.233 0.230 0.231 0.230 0.306 0.240 - -
BIC 525.3 526.4 528.1 529.3 529.6 366.5 529.2 −663.7 -
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are given in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is in natural log, except for the tobit and fractional probit
models. Time and country dummies are included, as well as a constant term, but the coefficients are not displayed in the table. The tobit model has a random effects specification, with the lower limit set at 0.00,
and the upper limit at 0.67. BIC stands for the Bayesian information criterion. Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Table 2. Cross-section estimation of the role of formal and informal institutions in explaining informal payments in health sector.
OLS Tobit Fractional Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of Education 0.540 * 0.563 0.478 0.833 0.901 * 0.831 0.991 0.184 *** 1.040 ***
(0.290) (0.652) (0.515) (0.604) (0.449) (0.749) (0.690) (0.0608) (0.306)
Log of age dependency −0.955 ** 0.217 −0.886 0.0143 −0.334 −0.0428 0.174 −0.0315 0.191
(0.474) (0.962) (0.770) (0.975) (0.710) (1.241) (1.209) (0.0979) (0.503)
Log of employment −1.666 *** −1.481 * −2.353 *** −1.513 * −1.891 *** −1.997 * −1.830 −0.280 ** −1.554 ***
(0.418) (0.783) (0.534) (0.759) (0.521) (1.127) (1.160) (0.108) (0.489)
Life expectancy −0.0510 *** −0.0857 −0.0442 −0.0619 0.0140 0.0110 0.0208 −0.00300 0.0238
(0.0184) (0.0660) (0.0288) (0.0604) (0.0318) (0.105) (0.102) (0.00856) (0.0469)
Log of Health expenditure −0.0272 −0.0786 −0.0530 −0.0594 −0.0390 −0.0348 −0.0379 −0.00811 −0.0886 *
(0.0399) (0.0688) (0.0715) (0.0633) (0.0613) (0.108) (0.108) (0.00653) (0.0474)
Log of Private health expenditure −0.00742 0.0139 −0.609 −0.0243 −0.491 −0.886 −0.807 −0.0673 −0.293
(0.151) (0.291) (0.385) (0.291) (0.392) (0.532) (0.487) (0.0404) (0.192)
Quality of governance −0.646 *** −0.842 *** −0.950 *** −0.805 −0.0647 * −0.404 **
(0.186) (0.298) (0.337) (0.500) (0.0359) (0.172)
Feel personally obliged to
report corruption
−0.0161 ** −0.0108 −0.0219 * −0.0166 −0.000390 −0.00486
(0.00775) (0.00838) (0.0118) (0.0144) (0.00121) (0.00545)
Trust −0.0140 −0.0103 −0.0378 ** −0.0324 * −0.000807 −0.00511
(0.0131) (0.0114) (0.0168) (0.0176) (0.00124) (0.00770)
Observations 113 63 42 63 42 28 28 29 29
BIC 296.6 178.0 118.9 173.5 114.2 85.46 85.45 −37.88 57.91
R-squared 0.584 0.539 0.583 0.598 0.659 0.649 0.689 - -
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logs. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is in natural log, except for the
tobit and fractional probit models. The lower limit for the tobit model was set at 0.00, and the upper limit at 0.67. Income level fixed effects following the World Bank classification (2018) are included, as well as a
constant term, but the coefficients are not displayed in the table. BIC stands for the Bayesian information criterion. The variables are averaged over a 5-year period (2009–2013). The variables capturing informal
institutions are from and around 2017, with a ±3 years margin interval.
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When looking at accessibility to health resources, our results display that neither
higher expenditures nor a higher density of medical workers make a significant contribu-
tion in tackling informal payments (infirming Hypothesis H2). Economic performance is
not related to the incidence of informal payments, as both economic growth and GDP per
capita are not statistically significant. However, bribes appear to be lower in countries with
a higher level of urbanization and higher employment levels (It also worth mentioning
that though in the panel specification employment level appears to be positively associated
with informal payments (Table 1), the opposite is unveiled in the longitudinal models
(Table 2). However, given the higher number of observations and the two-way fixed effects
specification, we consider the first specification to be preferable and comment the results
mainly according to them, where such contradictions may occur), which is generally also
where more economically intensive activities are placed (Hypothesis 4 is partially con-
firmed). The higher propensity of informal payments in the urban areas may be explained
by both the higher accessibility to healthcare services of the urban population, as well as
by their higher income levels [49,56,57].
Second, the variables capturing the quality of informal institutions appear to also be
negatively associated with a lower incidence of informal payments for healthcare, thus
validating H1b. Of course, due to a lack of time series data, these variables could only be
included in the cross-section model (Table 2). Our findings show that higher percentages
of the population feeling personally obliged to report corruption also leads to a lower
incidence of informal payments of patients (Model 2 in Table 2), which clearly hints that
personal values play a leading role in illicit practices.
Aside from high quality institutions, a solid moral behavior and an increased social
trust may also lead to lower informal payments. The two proxies for informal institutions
are simultaneously significant in Model 6 (Table 2). However, when the quality of gover-
nance is also included in the model, it is only the variable referring to social trust which
remains statistically significant. A 1% increase in the share of the population agreeing
that most people can be trusted is associated with a 3.2% decrease in bribes paid by pa-
tients. However, it is worth mentioning that the informal payments variables do not turn
statistically significant when the censored estimators are employed.
Finally, we do not find evidence for the role of education in mitigating illicit behav-
ior, as the variable referring to the number of schooling years did only turn statistically
significant in some of the cross-sectional models (Table 2). The same holds true for age
dependency. Finally, if life expectancy appears to be positively associated with the level
of informal payments when the two-way fixed effects is used, the opposite is true when
running the censored estimations, which requires caution when interpreting this result.
4. Discussion
Our findings emphasize institutional conditions as an important prerequisite for
tackling informal payments (a summary of the hypotheses tested is displayed in Table 3).
Though a higher range and reach of health service provision may be attained by improving
formal institutions, one also needs to enact a bottom-up approach in order to change the
social norms and values.
The quality of health institutions is directly related to the general quality of govern-
ment. Therefore, top-down policy initiatives should place greater emphasis on creating
proper institutional conditions as a prerequisite for better healthcare and a lower incidence
of informal payments. It is unlikely that the goals of efficient and equitable health care
delivery can be achieved without addressing the formal institutional bottlenecks [58]. Our
findings also show that positive externalities from economic growth might not be a suffi-
cient condition for increasing health equity and reducing illicit behaviors, unless they are
accompanied by solid institutions [59].
One of the main reasons behind informal payments is related to the fact that the health
sector is not being provided sufficient funding [60–62]. This might drastically impact the
accessibility and quality of care services by at least two mechanisms, both by the lack
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of necessary resources [63] and an unattractive wage level for health workers [64]. Both
channels might increase migration propensity [65] and discourage younger people in
embracing a medical career [66], which undermines the capacity of the health system to
become self-sufficient [67]. It is also worth mentioning that increasing health funding and,
consequently, the level of remuneration in the health sector, is not a sufficient condition
either for improving healthcare delivery, or for reducing illicit behaviors, unless it is
doubled by other reforms [8].














H1. Quality of Governance: Informal payments
in health are more likely to occur with
ill-functioning formal institutions.
Confirmed Significant negative impact of quality
of governance on informal payments.
H2. Resource allocation: Higher shares of
financial resources/private financing reduce
informal payments in health.
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H2a. The higher the share of health resources,
the lower the prevalence of informal
payments in health.
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health expenditures on informal
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financing, the lower the prevalence of
informal payments in health.
Confirmed Significant negative impact of
out-of-pocket and domestic private
health expenditure on informal
payments in health.
H3. Healthcare accessibility: higher
accessibility rates reduce informal payments
in health.
Not confirmed Unsignificant impact of the ratio of
physicians (per 10,000 inhabitants) on












s H4. Patient’s norms and values: Informal
payments in health are more likely to occur
with ‘bad’ informal institutions.
Confirmed Significant negative impact of trust,
and feel personally obliged to report
corruption on informal payments
in health.
Particular attention is required during periods of economic turmoil. Previous studies
have shown that during economic recession, there is an increased pressure on public
budgets, which makes health systems more susceptible to financial cuts [68]. Therefore,
attracting alternative private sources of finance might help health systems in facing future
possible shocks. For instance, our results indicate that higher shares of private financing,
such as out-of-pocket and domestic private health expenditure, are, overall, associated with
a lower incidence of informal payments. On the one hand, supporting private providers
of medical services might enlarge supply and, thus, accessibility for patients. It might
also lead to an overall improvement of efficiency in delivering healthcare, by stepping up
competition. Thus, widening private health coverage might be more efficient in mitigating
informal payments and combating the moral hazard which occurs when extending the
public health coverage [69]. On the other hand, increased attention is required when
designing such policies, as the possible negative effects on vulnerable groups is already
acknowledged in the literature [27,28]. Moreover, a greater reliance of the private market
might also lead to opportunistic behaviors. In a sector where informational asymmetry
is actually the rule, which makes patients vulnerable to opportunism and exploitation,
policy-makers may want to focus on reducing the information disadvantage [38]. Therefore,
a more attentive formulation of policy could be oriented towards increasing the motivation
of health workers. Besides increasing the overall wage levels, providing bonuses or relying
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on a fees-for-services model instead of fixed salaries, or designing quality instead of quality-
based criteria for reimbursement might increase their productivity and make them less
willing to accept under-the-table payments [26].
In addition, raising accountability of the health personnel by basic monitoring tools,
such as period internal assessments, might also reduce illicit payments, while also making
medical service providers responsible if abuse occurs [29]. Other kinds of policy-initiatives,
such as advertising campaigns, may help patients become aware that they are entitled
to a second opinion before opting for a healthcare product. Advertising campaigns may
also be helpful in making both patients and medical workers aware of the actual costs and
systemic risks related to under-the-table payments. Pursuing educational campaigns might
also be helpful in convincing citizens about their responsibility in paying taxes, in order to
support public services, including healthcare [70].
Further developments of this study should also be considered. First, widening the
geographical and time coverage of the data measuring informal payments may further
test the validity of our findings. Though we have a better coverage regarding the quality
of governance, the data measuring informal payments stop in 2013, and exclude many
countries in Africa, Central America, and Central Asia. The unbalanced nature of our
panel did not allow for such a specification. Finally, macroeconomic studies need to be
complemented by more qualitative analysis which might better reflect more specific drivers
explaining under-the-table payments. Where the majority of studies focus on the demand
side of informal payments, the supply side, namely the health workers’ perspectives, also
deserves more attention.
5. Conclusions
This study has focused on informal payments in the health sector which generate
additional barriers to healthcare delivery, and erode the relation between patients and
health workers. Specifically, the research has sought to explain informal payments through
the lens of institutional theory. The role of formal institutions, as well as the population
norms and values, was explored by carrying out a panel analysis. To our knowledge, there
is no similar study employing a dynamic analysis which captures such a wide range of
countries. The findings clearly emphasize that good governance, a higher trust among
individuals, and a higher responsibility in tackling corruption are important prerequisites
for tackling illicit payments. In addition, higher shares of private financing might also be
helpful in fighting against informal payments, but a more attentive formulation of policies
is required in order not to undermine the equity of healthcare services. This study provides
a solid argument for the leading role of developing formal and informal institutions as
a precondition for better healthcare. As previous studies argue [59], informal payments
are actually just a symptom of an unfair treatment by the healthcare system. Reducing
informal payments may primarily be achieved by a higher commitment to equity, and this
can mainly be driven by good institutions.
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Appendix A
List of countries included in our sample:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbai-
jan, Burundi, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Bolivia,
Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Colombia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Spain, Esto-
nia, Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Croatia,
Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iraq, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Korea, Republic of, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia,
Sri Lanka, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, Madagascar,
Maldives, Mexico, North Macedonia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Malawi, Malaysia, Nige-
ria, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Singa-
pore, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Serbia, South Sudan, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Vanuatu, Yemen, South Africa,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Bank
Urban Urban population (% of total population) World Bank
Table A2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel data
Informal Payments
Informal payments in health sector 354 13.39 14.02 0.00 66.45
High income 138 5.75 7.87 0.00 35.85
Upper-middle income 102 12.92 13.24 0.36 64.91
Lower-middle income 90 20.03 13.06 0.97 60.34
Low income 30 31.72 15.70 1.75 66.45
Formal institutions
Quality of governance 354 2.66 0.94 0.79 4.43
Health expenditures 354 6.81 2.60 1.78 16.35
Out-of-pocket expenditure 354 33.20 18.62 1.20 82.88
Private health expenditure 354 41.19 19.00 1.20 84.60
Doctor ratio 264 25.77 18.00 0.13 78.09
Other variables
Age dependency 354 56.60 15.91 26.99 104.70
Education 354 9.13 3.44 1.69 14.69
Employment 354 56.95 11.12 31.64 87.02
GDP per capita 346 21,318.13 18,789.94 746.30 91,533.16
GDP per capita growth 346 4.48 7.34 −27.87 36.08
Life expectancy 354 72.40 7.93 48.47 83.33
Urban 354 61.57 21.22 10.92 100.00
Cross-sectional data
Informal payments
Informal payments in health sector 113 15.00 13.68 0.50 66.45
High income 40 6.70 8.01 0.50 33.07
Upper-middle income 32 13.84 11.85 1.83 50.95
Lower-middle income 27 20.43 11.17 3.46 44.56
Low income 14 30.86 17.00 2.95 66.45
Formal institutions
Quality of governance 113 2.55 0.93 0.86 4.39
Health expenditures 113 6.76 2.60 2.06 16.28
Private health expenditure 113 40.18 18.41 1.64 79.07
Informal institutions
Feel personally obliged to report corruption 64 56.17 20.69 10.00 92.00
Trust 42 19.71 15.12 2.14 63.98
Other variables
Age dependency 113 57.64 17.35 27.46 103.19
Education 113 8.88 3.60 1.73 14.46
Employment 113 57.61 12.18 33.49 86.46
Life expectancy 113 72.08 7.98 50.17 82.96
Note: Given that the data referring to informal payments in health is only available for 2006–2007, 2009–2011, and 2013, the variables are
summarized for these periods. For cross-sectional variables, 5-year averages are computed (2009–2013). The variables from QoG Standard
Cross Section dataset, and are from and around 2017, with a ±3 years margin interval (feel personally obliged to report corruption and
trust). Income level is set following the World Bank classification (2018).







: Authors’ representation using data from Transpa
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Figure A1. The relation between informal payments in health and informal institutions. (a) The relation between informal
payments in health and social trust. Source: Authors’ ep sentation using data from Transparency International and World
Value Survey. (b) The relation between informal payments in health and the personal engagement in reporting corruption.
Source: Authors’ representation using data from Transparency International.
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Ensuring Integrity in Governments’ Response to COVID
Figure A2. The quality of formal and informal institutions. (a) The quality of governance index (0–5 best, 2009–2013). Notes: The
index was rescaled to 0–5 values. The six dimensions of the index were aggregated using a factorial analysis. The classes include
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an equal number of observations. Source: Authors’ representation using data from Transparency International and World
Value Survey. (b) Social trust (% respondents). Notes: Share of people responding that ‘Most people can be trusted’ to the
following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people?’ The values are from and around 2017, with a ±3 years margin interval. The classes include an equal
number of observations. Source: Authors’ representation using data from the World Values Survey. (c) Personal engagement
in reporting corruption (% respondents, 2009–2013). Notes: Share of people agreeing with the following statement: ‘Feel
personally obliged to report corruption’. The values are from and around 2017, with a ±3 years margin interval. The classes
include an equal number of observations. Source: Authors’ representation using data from Transparency International.
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